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Social Justice and Silicon Valley: A Perspective on the 
Apple-FBI Case and the “Going Dark” Debate 
MAJ. GEN. CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF (RET.)* 
INTRODUCTION 
Social justice, we are told, “is generally equated with the notion of 
equality or equal opportunity in society.”1 It also embraces the idea of 
economic justice.2 This essay argues that these concepts are involved in 
last year’s dispute between Apple Inc. and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) over an encrypted phone found among the possessions 
of one perpetrator of the San Bernardino massacre that killed fourteen 
people and wounded twenty-two.3  
The phone was believed to be evidence in a terrorism case, and the FBI 
received permission from the owner of the phone (the San Bernardino 
County Department of Public Health) to search its content. They were 
stymied, however, by the Apple phone’s encryption software that 
effectively “locked” the phone. The FBI then obtained a court order under 
the All Writs Act4 compelling Apple’s assistance in unlocking the phone, 
but the corporation resisted doing so.5 The Department of Justice 
eventually dropped the case against Apple when the FBI gained access to 
                                                                                                                          
* Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, USAF (Ret.) is a Professor of the Practice of Law and Executive 
Director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of Law.  The 
author wishes to thank the many members of the Connecticut Law Review whose very significant 
efforts made this essay possible. 
1 Allan Scherlen & Matthew Robinson, Open Access to Criminal Justice Scholarship: A Matter of 
Social Justice, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 54, 62 (2008). 
2 Defining Economic Justice and Social Justice, CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. JUST., 
http://www.cesj.org/learn/definitions/defining-economic-justice-and-social-justice/ [https://perma.cc/ 
UC4G-GVN7] (last visited Jan. 26, 2017). 
3 For general background, see Arjun Kharpal, Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar. 
29, 2016, 6:34 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html 
[https://perma.cc/ALL3-MDPH]; Everything We Know About the San Bernardino Terror Attack 
Investigation So Far, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015, 4:03 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-san-bernardino-shooting-terror-investigation-
htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/MQ3A-6YWR] (providing information on the San Bernardino terror 
attack investigation). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).  
5 See Kharpal, supra note 3 (“The judge asked Apple to provide ‘reasonable technical assistance’ 
to the U.S. authorities, which would require the technology giant to overhaul the system that disables 
the phone after 10 unsuccessful password attempts. Once this feature kicks in, all the data on the phone 
is inaccessible. Apple declined to help the FBI.”).  
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the phone with the help of a third party.6  
Nevertheless, the dispute highlights what has been called the “going 
dark” debate, where technology is frustrating the ability of law 
enforcement to investigate crimes and national security threats, even where 
the government is working through the judiciary.7 Apple’s contention that 
“nothing is more important than the safety of all of our customers”8 is 
juxtaposed against the FBI’s broader mission to “protect the American 
people”9 in general (and not just Apple customers), as well as the Supreme 
Court’s admonition in Haig v. Agee10 that “no governmental interest is 
more compelling than the security of the Nation.”11  
While Apple argued that the main dispute was one about individual 
privacy rights against government intrusion, in truth, it engages 
fundamental notions of social justice and the rule of law. This Essay 
suggests several key questions.  First, in a free society, to what extent 
should Silicon Valley—as opposed to the courts—determine what law 
enforcement professionals can and cannot do, particularly when the tech 
moguls making that determination have the wealth to insulate themselves 
from the consequences of their decisions?12   
Additionally, if commercial companies believe that encryption is vital 
to the viability of their brand, should they nevertheless bear the costs when 
their devices enable the commission of criminal acts and terrorism? Should 
a statutory presumption be established to benefit victims where a 
                                                                                                                          
6 Laurie Segall et al., FBI Says It Has Cracked Terrorist’s iPhone Without Apple’s Help, 
CNNMONEY (Mar. 29, 2016, 9:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/28/news/companies/fbi-apple-
iphone-case-cracked/ [https://perma.cc/TU4C-4SKD]. 
7 See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44481, ENCRYPTION AND THE “GOING DARK” 
DEBATE 1 (2016) (“[S]ome posit that law enforcement is ‘going dark’ as their investigative capabilities 
are outpaced by the speed of technological change. As such, law enforcement cannot access certain 
information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain.”); Apple vs. the FBI: The Complete Guide, 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/special-reports/apple-fbi-encryption-standoff 
[https://perma.cc/JQ3K-7XWV] (last visited Jan. 25, 2017) (providing different perspectives on the 
ongoing debate over “encryption, privacy, and the iPhone”). 
8 Craig Federighi, Opinion, Apple VP: The FBI Wants to Roll Back Safeguards That Keep Us a 
Step Ahead of Criminals, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/apple-vp-the-fbi-wants-to-roll-back-safeguards-that-keep-
us-a-step-ahead-of-criminals/2016/03/06/cceb0622-e3d1-11e5-a6f3-21ccdbc5f74e_story.html? 
utm_term=.d7607a35734f [https://perma.cc/P7EM-CX5H].   
9 Mission & Priorities, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/mission [https://perma.cc/7P5Z-8PYD] 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2017).  
10 453 U.S. 280 (1981).  
11 Id. at 307.  
12 See Evan Osnos, Doomsday Prep for the Super-Rich, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/30/doomsday-prep-for-the-super-rich 
[https://perma.cc/9WZA-Z2F3] (discussing how “[s]urvivalism, the practice of preparing for a crackup 
of civilization . . . [has] in recent years . . . expanded to more affluent quarters, taking root in Silicon 
Valley and New York City, among technology executives, hedge-fund managers, and others in their 
economic cohort”).   
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reasonable inference is established that a phone or similar device was used 
by the perpetrator of a crime or terrorist act where the company involved 
either designed it with “unbreakable” encryption or refuses to aid in its 
decryption despite a court order? 
Along these lines, in a nation where courts have traditionally resolved 
the inherent tension between privacy and security, are we seeing 
adjudication, de facto, shift to private entities with a commercial interest in 
the outcome? Does former Director of the CIA John Brennan raise a 
legitimate concern when he says, in reference to the Apple-FBI case, that: 
So . . . if a judge issues a writ that says a safety deposit box 
in a bank must be opened up because there’s something in 
there either inculpatory, exculpatory of the crime or 
something that’s going to allow us to prevent a crime, the 
bank owner has a legal obligation to open it up. Same thing 
with a warehouse owner, or somebody who owns an 
apartment building. Now private sector companies are 
getting the ability to say to the government and to the courts 
and to our system of laws, no, I’m going to determine what 
the government is going to be able to see or not[?]13 
Moreover, in a free enterprise system, to what extent should the 
legitimate financial interests of private companies14—not to mention the 
bona fide individual interests and rights of the customers of that 
company—prevail over the security interests of the public at large, to 
include those whose financial means are such that they must depend upon 
government for protection as the wealthy do not?15 How much privacy and 
civil liberty does the public want to forfeit in a technological era that 
Thomas Friedman tells us is enabling even individuals to become what he 
calls “super-empowered” individuals to “kill all of us”?16 Is he correct 
when he says, “[W]e need to ensure our government has all the 
                                                                                                                          
13 JOHN BRENNAN, A CANDID CONVERSATION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, INTERVIEW AT 
THE ASPEN SECURITY FORUM 22 (Jul. 29, 2016), http://aspensecurityforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/a-candid-conversation-with-the-director-of-the-cia.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XFD3-XQ9P] (emphasis added).   
14 David Goldman, Apple’s iPhone Sales Sink for the First Time Ever Last Quarter, CNN (Apr. 
26, 2016, 5:45 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/26/technology/apple-earnings/ 
[https://perma.cc/7SN4-E68S].  
15 See, e.g., Ian Mohr, Mark Zuckerberg Hired 16 Bodyguards to Protect Him at Home, PAGE SIX 
(Feb. 14, 2016, 10:30 PM), http://pagesix.com/2016/02/14/mark-zuckerberg-has-16-bodyguards-at-his-
home/ [https://perma.cc/T3P5-EV7F] (reporting that “young tech billionaires” like Mark Zuckerberg 
can afford their own security details to protect them from “threats from unstable users”).   
16  See Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Lessons of Hiroshima and Orlando, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/opinion/lessons-of-hiroshima-and-orlando.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/L6M9-NNNV] (“[W]e’re entering a world where small groups—maybe even soon a 
single super-empowered person—will be able to kill all of us . . . .”). 
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surveillance powers it needs—under appropriate judicial review—to 
monitor and arrest violent extremists of all stripes. The bad guys now have 
too many tools to elude detection”?17  
At the same time, however, we need to keep in mind, as Mieke Eoyang 
has pointed out, that “[t]he debate is often framed as a balance between 
government power and individual privacy.”18 Eoyang says this too often 
overlooks the “critical role of the communications companies, who as 
physical and legal gatekeepers regulate government access to private 
information.”19 She also states that “when the government does not 
properly balance the economic concerns with the national security 
concerns it can harm U.S. competitiveness abroad.”20 
The purpose of this short Essay is not to dissect the technicalities of the 
Apple-FBI litigation, but rather to argue that in a democracy, there will 
always be tensions between privacy and security. And in resolving such 
tensions, social justice would call for a better accounting of the needs of 
those who are not customers of a particular commercial entity and who 
cannot depend for security upon their own resources, but rather must look 
to law enforcement and government for protection. 
I. CONTEXT 
The Apple-FBI dispute resulted from a tragic December 2015 attack 
by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik, in San Bernardino, 
California, in which fourteen people were killed and twenty-two were 
injured in what has been called “a vicious and premeditated terrorist 
attack.”21 Farook and Malik were later killed in a shootout with police.22   
In the investigation that followed, a search pursuant to a warrant of 
Farook’s vehicle produced a cell phone belonging to his employer, the San 
                                                                                                                          
17 Id. (emphasis added).  
18 Mieke Eoyang & David Forscey, Beyond Privacy & Security: The Role of the 
Telecommunications Industry in Electronic Surveillance, LAWFARE (Apr. 11, 2016, 7:22 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-privacy-security-role-telecommunications-industry-electronic-
surveillance-0 [https://perma.cc/262R-9QZU].  
19 Id. 
20 Mieke Eoyang, Beyond Privacy and Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in 
Electronic Surveillance 5 (Hoover Inst., Aegis Paper Series No. 1603, Apr. 8, 2016),  
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/eoyang_privacysecurity_final_v3_digital.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/63PW-4FBW].   
21 RICK BRAZIEL ET AL., CRITICAL RESPONSE INITIATIVE, OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING 
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BRINGING CALM TO CHAOS: A CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW OF THE SAN 
BERNARDINO PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSE TO THE DECEMBER 2, 2015, TERRORIST SHOOTING INCIDENT 
AT THE INLAND REGIONAL CENTER ix (2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/891996/download 
[https://perma.cc/3HFC-RM63]. 
22 See id. at 39–40 (explaining the gunfight and the manner in which the assailants were shot by 
police).  
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Bernardino County Department of Health.23 What happened next is 
explained in the government’s later application to the court:  
In the hopes of gaining crucial evidence about the December 
2, 2015 massacre in San Bernardino, California, the 
government has sought to search a lawfully-seized Apple 
iPhone used by one of the mass murderers. Despite both a 
warrant authorizing the search and the phone owner’s 
consent, the government has been unable to complete the 
search because it cannot access the iPhone’s encrypted 
content. Apple has the exclusive technical means which 
would assist the government in completing its search, but has 
declined to provide that assistance voluntarily. Accordingly, 
the government respectfully requests that this Court issue an 
order compelling Apple to assist in enabling the search 
commanded by the warrant.24 
The government needed Apple’s technical assistance because the 
phone’s software was such that the government was unable to “unlock” the 
phone without risking the destruction of whatever data it might have 
held.25 The court issued an order to Apple compelling their cooperation,26 
but Apple resisted the court’s motion.27 Nevertheless, before there was any 
definitive resolution, the government ended the litigation when it advised 
the court it had “successfully accessed the data stored on Farook’s iPhone 
                                                                                                                          
23 Government’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s Feb. 16, 2016 Order 
Compelling Assistance in Search at 5, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of 
a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 
2016 WL 618401769612 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016). 
24 Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search at 3, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 19, 2016). 
25 Government’s Motion to Compel, supra note 23, at 5 (“Nonetheless, despite the search warrant 
ordered by the Court and the owner’s consent to search the SUBJECT DEVICE, the FBI has been 
unable to search [it] because it is ‘locked’ or secured with a user-determined, numeric passcode.  More 
to the point, the FBI has been unable to make attempts to determine the passcode to access the [device] 
because Apple has written, or ‘coded,’ its operating systems with a user-enabled ‘auto-erase function’ 
that would, if enabled, result in the permanent destruction of the required encryption key material after 
10 failed attempts at entering the correct passcode.”). 
26 In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black 
Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 16, 2016) (order compelling Apple, Inc. to assist agents in search). 
27 See Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San 
Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903ee-
d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?postshare=9501485386886260&tid=ss_mail&utm_term=
.72ab40da8569 [https://perma.cc/A26U-HRSV] (explaining Apple’s decision to fight federal demands). 
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and therefore no longer require[d] the assistance from Apple Inc.”28  
II. THE APPLE STRATEGY 
Apple always wanted to portray its case in a way that postured itself as 
the defender of privacy and personal safety versus an Orwellian 
government, but it is really more about a mammoth corporation’s interests 
versus the rule of law and the people who do not happen to be their 
customers or, if they are their customers, people without the resources of 
those who would most benefit financially from the ability to sell a “law 
enforcement proof” communications device.  
Apple engaged in a well-conceived and well-executed public relations 
campaign to propagate its view of the dispute. In a February 16, 2016 letter 
to customers, Apple CEO Tim Cook characterized the FBI’s court order as 
a threat to privacy which would “undermine the very freedoms and liberty 
our government is meant to protect.”29 Similarly, the company’s Vice 
President, Craig Federighi, wrote an op-ed claiming that “nothing is more 
important than the safety” of Apple customers.30 Essentially, Apple argued 
that “if it were to weaken the encryption on one phone, the encryption on 
all phones of that type would be weakened, too.”31  
According to Apple, the decryption “would in effect create an opening 
through which some clever bad apple could wreak all kinds of chaos.”32 In 
other words, Apple’s announced focus was on its customers. Quite 
obviously, the FBI would be concerned not just with those who choose to 
be Apple’s customers, but rather with the citizenry writ large, to include 
those who elect not to be customers either by choice or by the absence of 
financial resources. In addition, there are the interests of those for whom 
the privacy value of an encrypted phone, whether theirs or another’s, does 
not outweigh the desire to be protected from the mayhem of those whose 
illicit activities would be facilitated by the technology. 
The FBI did try to counter Apple’s hype and temper public concerns:  
former FBI Director James Comey said law enforcement “simply want[s] 
                                                                                                                          
28 Government’s Status Report at 1, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution 
of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016); see also Proposed Order Vacating Feb. 16, 2016 Order, In re Search of an 
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California 
License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016) (“The Court has reviewed the 
government’s Status Report . . . the Court hereby [vacates] the Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist 
Agents in Search dated February 16, 2016.”).  
29 Letter from Tim Cook, CEO, Apple, to Customers (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/CER6-45KL]. 
30 Federighi, supra note 8. 
31 Mark Sullivan, Where Will Trump Fall on the Encryption Debate? Tough Call, FAST CO. (Dec. 
29, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.fastcompany.com/3066637/tech-forecast/where-will-trump-fall-on-
the-encryption-debate-tough-call [https://perma.cc/CW5D-LPT5]. 
32 Id.  
 2017] SOCIAL JUSTICE AND SILICON VALLEY 1693 
the chance, with a search warrant, to try to guess the terrorist’s passcode 
without the phone essentially self-destructing and without it taking a 
decade to guess correctly. That’s it.”33  
But Apple’s advocacy efforts enjoyed real success. Although initially 
polls showed that the majority of Americans supported the FBI over Apple, 
they later showed the public to be split more evenly.34 This led many, like 
commentator Mark Sullivan, to conclude that “Apple eventually won the 
PR war, successfully spreading the message that weakening encryption 
hurts everybody and works against both national security and law 
enforcement interests.”35  
III. THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 
Despite the way Apple presented its case, it is clear that it had interests 
beyond the stated fear that “the very freedoms and liberty our government 
is meant to protect” were in jeopardy.36 Specifically, it is apparent that 
Apple was under real financial pressure at the time the San Bernardino 
case arose. In April 2016, the corporation reported “its worst quarter in 
over a decade.”37 More specifically as to the devices in the Apple-FBI case, 
CNN said “iPhone sales fell for the first time in history.”38 This is critical 
for Apple because “more than two-thirds of Apple’s revenue is made up of 
iPhone sales.”39 Consequently, CNN’s David Goldman concludes that 
“where the iPhone goes, so goes Apple.”40  
Early on, the New York Times suggested that there were factors of 
impersonal corporate interests at play in the case. The Times said:  
The company is playing the long game with its business. 
Privacy and security have become part of its brand, 
especially internationally, where it reaps almost two-thirds of 
its almost $234 billion a year in sales. And if it cooperates 
with one government, the thinking goes, it will have to 
                                                                                                                          
33 James B. Comey, We Could Not Look the Survivors in the Eye If We Did Not Follow This Lead, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2016, 9:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-could-not-look-survivors-eye-
if-we-did-not-follow-lead [https://perma.cc/TSJ9-RKQW].  
34 Ben Lovejoy, WSJ/NBC Poll Shows Public Support for Apple’s Side of FBI Battle Growing, 
Now Close to Even Split, 9TO5MAC (Mar. 9, 2016 4:07 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2016/03/09/apple-
fbi-public-poll-2/ [https://perma.cc/LR9W-K67M].  
35 Sullivan, supra note 31.  
36 Cook, supra note 29.  
37 Goldman, supra note 14.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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cooperate with all of them.41  
Businessman Blair Reeves made this point unequivocally:  
For several years now, Apple has explicitly made “privacy” a 
key marketing stick with which to beat its chief competitor, 
Google. Certainly, a stated commitment to protect customer 
privacy is vital to Apple’s brand and continuing business 
strategy. Apple’s CEO and employees may be expressing 
genuinely held private convictions, but the regulatory theater 
in which Apple, the corporation, is currently embarked is 
without question motivated by its business concerns.42  
Of course, Silicon Valley, one of the greatest concentrations of 
extreme wealth on the planet,43 rallied to support Apple, seeming to forget 
that while they can hire armies of bodyguards and other security,44 the bulk 
of the citizenry is vastly more vulnerable to those terrorists and criminals 
who will exploit any inability of law enforcement and the courts to 
penetrate their communications. The Silicon Valley billionaires seem to be 
forgetting that the reason they have made all their money is that they are 
privileged to live in a country with robust policing and a strong judiciary.  
In addition, Apple makes two thirds of its sales overseas including 
some $59 billion in China.45 The Los Angeles Times suggested that Apple 
was trying to calm the national security concerns of the Chinese 
government, while making accommodations, such as storing data on 
                                                                                                                          
41 Katie Benner & Paul Mozur, Apple Sees Value in Its Stand to Protect Security, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/technology/apple-sees-value-in-privacy-
vow.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/86W7-AN9Q]. 
42 Blair Reeves, Demystifying Apple’s FAQ—A Rebuttal, LAWFARE (Feb. 29, 2016, 12:24 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/demystifying-apples-faq-–-rebuttal [https://perma.cc/AMJ9-2P5A]. 
43 See Rich Robinson, Silicon Valley: Richest Region in America Can, Must Do Better, SAN JOSE 
INSIDE (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.sanjoseinside.com/2015/10/20/silcion-valley-richest-region-in-
america-can-must-do-better/ [https://perma.cc/62T3-PH8M] (noting that the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa 
Clara metro area’s median household income is the highest in the United States); Josie Ensor, Silicon 
Valley Mints 23 New Billionaires to Become Best Place to Get Rich, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:28 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11446029/Silicon-Valley-mints-
23-new-billionaires-to-become-best-place-to-get-rich.html [https://perma.cc/J2QJ-RZVD] (noting that 
Silicon Valley is “home to the greatest number of billionaires on the planet after China and the U.S.”). 
44 See Mohr, supra note 15 ( “Insiders tell Page Six that the young tech billionaires are forced to 
hire armies of guards after threats from unstable users.”).  
45 See David Pierson, While It Defies U.S. Government, Apple Abides by China’s Orders—and 
Reaps Big Rewards, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-apple-china-20160226-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/PMV2-QB9Z] (noting that sales of Apple products in the greater China region 
reached $59 billion last year); Non-U.S. Share of Apple’s Revenue from 1st Quarter 2006 to 1st 
Quarter 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263435/non-us-share-of-apples-revenue/ 
[https://perma.cc/FPU9-RF2M] (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (showing that 64% of Apple’s revenue in 
the first quarter of 2017 came from outside of the U.S.). 
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vulnerable servers in China.46 The Times quoted James Lewis, senior 
fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, 
who said:  
“What’s driving this is Apple’s desire to persuade the global 
market, and particularly the China market, that the FBI can’t 
just stroll in and ask for data . . . . I can’t imagine the Chinese 
would tolerate end-to-end encryption or a refusal to 
cooperate with their police, particularly in a terrorism 
case.”47 
In short, Apple is—and has been—monetizing the value of privacy to 
reinforce its brand in the marketplace. There is nothing unlawful, per se, 
about a commercial interest in doing just that; this issue is to what extent—
if any—should that be limited.  
IV. TRADE OFFS 
A couple of things need to be made clear. In the first place, in a free-
enterprise system, there is nothing illegal about a corporation seeking to 
maximize its profits within the law. Indeed, there is much to be said about 
the idea that competition in the marketplace injects an efficiency into 
commerce that inures to the benefit of all. At the same time, however, the 
untamed pursuit of profits has proven itself to be, at times, detrimental to 
the society at large. For this reason, there are times when government 
intervention is prudent and necessary.  
One of those instances arises in resolving the inherent tension between 
the value of a corporate quest for profits in a free-enterprise system, and 
the interests of government in the security of the people. As to the latter, 
the Supreme Court in Haig v. Agee observed that “[i]t is ‘obvious and 
unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the 
security of the Nation.”48   
Interestingly, Apple implicitly argued that even that imperative has its 
limits. In its March 22, 2016 motion it said:  
However, while the government’s desire to maximize 
security is laudable, the decision of how to do so while also 
protecting other vital interests, such as personal safety and 
privacy, is for American citizens to make through the 
democratic process. Indeed, examples abound of society 
                                                                                                                          
46 See Pierson, supra note 45 (describing how Apple shifted local user data onto China-based 
servers after the Chinese state-run media raised national security concerns about the iPhone’s location-
tracking feature). 
47 Id. 
48 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).  
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opting not to pay the price for increased and more efficient 
enforcement of criminal laws.49  
Apple has a point. Though not one of the examples the Apple used, the 
tragedy of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting does illustrate 
“society opting not to pay the price” for greater security. In December 
2015 an NBC News analysis found that in the three years since Adam 
Lanza killed twenty children and six adults at the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School, 555 children had been killed by intentional and unintentional gun 
violence.50 As horrific as those numbers are, they pale in comparison with 
the 1,907 children killed as occupants of motor vehicles during 
approximately the same period.51 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
estimates that in 2014 alone, 121,350 children age twelve and under 
suffered a vehicle-related injury.52  
What is particularly disturbing is how easily avoidable so many of 
those deaths and injuries were. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
and the Highway Loss Data Institute insist that “proper restraint use can 
reduce these fatalities.”53 They contend that studies show that the correct 
use of car seats can reduce these fatalities. “Restraining children in rear 
seats instead of front seats reduces fatal injury risk by about three quarters 
for children up to age 3, and almost half for children ages 4 to 8.”54  
For its part, the CDC says that in 2014, 34% of the children who were 
killed were “not buckled up.”55 The CDC also says that a study found that 
“more than 618,000 children ages 0 to 12 rode in vehicles without the use 
of a child safety seat or booster seat or a seat belt at least some of the 
time.”56 It “recommends car seat laws and car seat distribution plus 
education programs to increase restraint use and decrease injuries and 
deaths to child passengers.”57   
These statistics indicate that draconian enforcement of car seat laws 
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would likely save more children than restrictions on guns. But even if 
Apple’s suggestion that Americans are willing to “pay the price for 
increased and more efficient enforcement of criminal laws”58 is correct, 
that is not necessarily the case here. Among other things, the Apple-FBI 
confrontation involved terrorism, something markedly different in the 
public’s mind. For example, a September 2016 Monmouth University poll 
found that 56% of Americans believed that the government was not doing 
enough to prevent a future attack.59  
The terrorism concern is understandable. In his new book, Thank You 
for Being Late, author Thomas Friedman makes the point that today’s 
technology can create super-empowered terrorists, where even a single 
individual can wreak havoc on unprecedented numbers of people.60 Even 
more clearly than the Monmouth University poll, a Quinnipiac University 
poll in September 2016 found that only 27% of Americans believed 
government’s antiterrorism policies went “too far [in] restricting [the 
average person’s] civil liberties,” while 51% said those policies “have not 
gone far enough to adequately protect the country.”61 In short, 
encryption—with its potential as a tool of terrorism—poses a unique threat 
to public safety beyond that of ordinary criminality, which Apple seems to 
be referencing. 
V. THE SOCIAL JUSTICE QUESTIONS 
Law enforcement needs to comply with the Constitution and other 
legal requirements, and that typically requires getting a warrant or order 
from a court. When that happens, law enforcement ought to get the access 
the judge authorizes but no more. The Supreme Court in Riley v. California 
recognized the increased privacy concerns surrounding modern 
information technology—and specifically cell phones—and has extended 
the range of Fourth Amendment protection accorded to devices, but the 
Court has never suggested that the technologies ought to be beyond 
judicial process if a company can make the technology hyper secure.62 
That said, no company should think itself above the law. Apple 
repeatedly cast the issue as one requiring resolution in the legislature. But 
in the interim, Apple seems to want the power to decide sensitive questions 
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of public security. Along these lines, former Director of the CIA John 
Brennan commented on the Apple-FBI case by observing that tech 
companies are now able to supplant the judgment of not just law 
enforcement, but of the courts as well.63  
Therefore, if a judge issues a writ that says a safety deposit box in a 
bank must be opened up because there is something in there that is either 
inculpatory, exculpatory, or something that is going to allow us to prevent 
a crime, the bank owner has a legal obligation to open it up. The same 
situation happens with a warehouse owner, or somebody who owns an 
apartment building.  
Now, private sector companies are getting the ability to say to the 
government, and to the courts: “[N]o, I’m going to determine what the 
government is going to be able to see or not.”64 
Put another way, should a company be allowed to refuse to open some 
kind of a safe, so as to allow a child pornographer to flaunt a bona fide 
search warrant? Should a certain class of criminals be permitted to avoid 
searches simply because they can afford to buy some kind of high-end safe 
or data encryption device? Why should people who, for example, send 
letters searchable with a warrant enjoy less privacy than someone who can 
afford the latest high-tech data gadget?  
This reiterates the fallacy of Craig Federighi, Apple’s Vice President, 
that “nothing is more important than the safety” of Apple customers; that 
logic does not comport with the fact that few things are more valuable to 
the most dangerous terrorists and criminals than the ability to conceal their 
communications from law enforcement and the courts.65 If Apple (or 
anyone else) is allowed to sell devices that allow terrorists to plot and plan 
in secret, those terrorists will surely be customers, as will a host of other 
deviants and criminals.  
Of course, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies still have to 
comply with the law, even though they now have a way into the phone at 
issue in the San Bernardino case. The ethical question is: given the horrific 
terrorist incident involved, was it ethical for a company to delay law 
enforcement’s access to this particular phone where the owner of the phone 
wanted the FBI to have that access?  
Some can literally afford to wait. After all, Silicon Valley is one of the 
wealthiest places on earth. The tech moguls who live there have little to 
worry about in terms of security for themselves and their families, as they 
can afford to buy as many layers of protection as they want. The rest of the 
citizenry, however, depend upon law enforcement agencies for protection, 
and their success in that effort can depend upon the ability to get 
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information in compliance with court orders. Fortunately, another attack 
did not take place this time, but we all can imagine a different outcome in 
some future case. Should security really depend upon our ability to buy it 
privately as tech tycoons can? 
Make no mistake about it, the residents of Silicon Valley and similarly 
privileged enclaves are concerned about their own security and are using 
their economic superiority to ensure it in ways that most Americans 
cannot. A recent New Yorker article addressing the “Doomsday Prep for 
the Super-Rich,” pointed out that “[s]ome of the wealthiest people in 
America—in Silicon Valley, New York, and beyond—are getting ready for 
the crackup of civilization.”66 The article noted that:  
Survivalism, the practice of preparing for a crackup of 
civilization, tends to evoke a certain picture: the woodsman 
in the tinfoil hat, the hysteric with the hoard of beans, the 
religious doomsayer. But in recent years survivalism has 
expanded to more affluent quarters, taking root in Silicon 
Valley and New York City, among technology executives, 
hedge-fund managers, and others in their economic cohort.67  
If one of Apple’s motives for resisting the court order centered on its 
financial interests and brand value, perhaps Congress should devise a 
market-driven solution and create an appropriate cause of action for 
victims of terrorist incidents or other crimes. For example, if the evidence 
shows that the perpetrator had an encrypted device, a rebuttable 
presumption that such a device facilitated a plaintiff’s victimization might 
be created by statute. The company could then choose to either provide 
access to the device to demonstrate that it had no connection with the 
incident, or accept the liability and inject that cost into the price of the 
device. Experience with big business—auto manufacturers, drug makers, 
chemical giants, tobacco companies, and more—shows that too often it 
needs to be motivated by the fear of lawsuits in order to take actions to 
protect public safety. 
By obliging the FBI to turn to a private contractor to crack the 
encryption, Apple may have incentivized legitimate companies to get into 
the business of cracking phones and other high-tech devices for law 
enforcement. In essence, they have broadened the legal market for hackers 
and others.  
Moreover—and rather ironically—Apple’s intransigence may have 
backfired. As journalist Chris Smith observed, the success of the FBI’s 
contractor “proves what we all suspected: that independent security 
companies and hackers know how to bypass the safety of the iPhone and 
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other devices if need be.”68 In essence, Apple created a legitimate market 
for hacking its phones on behalf of law enforcement. Moreover, instead of 
controlling the ability to unlock the phones, as would have been the case 
had Apple complied with the initial demand, that capability is now in the 
hands of the FBI—and it appears that the FBI is willing to share its success 
with other law enforcement agencies.69 
Indeed, did Apple’s recalcitrance endanger its own customers? Recall 
that Apple itself said that once an encryption-cracking protocol was 
developed, the technique could be used over and over again, on any 
number of devices. Apple said that “in the physical world, it would be the 
equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of 
locks—from restaurants and banks to stores and homes.”70 It seems that 
tech companies are better off complying with court orders, and using or 
developing their own means of accessing their own products, than they are 
at acting in a way that invites other entities, over whom they have no 
control, to set up shop to serve law enforcement in these kinds of 
situations. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief Essay can at best be said to touch upon just a few of the 
issues raised by the “going dark” debate. That debate is hardly over. In 
August 2016, FBI Director James Comey described the situation of some 
5,000 cell phones forwarded to the FBI for forensic examination. Comey 
said of the cell phones: 
About 650 of them we could not open. We did not have the 
technology. We can’t open them. They are a brick to us. 
Those are cases unmade. That’s evidence unfound. That has 
a significant impact on our work and on the work of law 
enforcement. We see this shadow, this inability to execute on 
court orders, becoming more and more a part of our life as 
encryption—especially strong encryption for data at rest, 
default encryption on devices—becomes a bigger feature of 
our life.71  
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Of course, in a real way, the “going dark” debate raises profound 
issues about the role of technology in our society. In a fascinating (albeit 
hyper partisan) essay considering the recent election, Wired Editor-at-
Large Jason Tanz makes some interesting observations about the impact of 
communication technologies on contemporary political life, as well as 
somewhat indirect comments on the prescience and wisdom (or, more 
accurately, the absence of the same) of some tech entrepreneurs.72   
Ruefully noting that President Trump used the “tools and language of 
the technocracy” to gain the White House, Tanz concludes that Silicon 
Valley efforts at designing technology to “maximize engagement . . .  
inadvertently created hives of bias-confirmation and tribalism.”73 
If one overlooks Tanz’s politics, he does pose some trenchant broader 
questions that resonate in social justice. As he says, society needs to ask 
itself “bigger questions”: 
Questions like: Is technology always an ennobling force?  
Questions like: Does allowing humanity untrammeled access 
to one another always result in a better world?  Questions 
like:  Are individuals capable of processing all the 
information that they once relied on institutions to process 
for them? Questions like: After people free themselves from 
their social and cultural shackles, then what?74 
The full essay does suggest that Tanz has a sense of his own elitism, 
but the power of his questions remains. In a free society, to what extent 
should the byte barons of Silicon Valley determine what law enforcement 
professionals can and cannot do, particularly when they can insulate 
themselves from the consequences of their decisions?  
Congress may act. In an election year when partisanship seems to 
know no limits, leaders from the two parties did work together to try to 
reign in the tech moguls. Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Richard 
Burr (R-N.C.) authored a draft bill entitled the “Compliance with Court 
Orders Act of 2016.”75 Its key section simply said: 
To uphold both the rule of law and protect the interests and 
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security of the United States, all persons receiving an 
authorized judicial order for information or data must 
provide, in a timely manner, responsive, intelligible 
information or data, or appropriate technical assistance to 
obtain such information or data . . . .76 
The proposal immediately drew howls of protest from the tech 
industry, apoplectic over what they claimed—with some real logic—
“basically outlaws end-to-end encryption.”77 The bill died. 
Despite the poor reception for the Feinstein-Burr effort, Austin Carson, 
a legislative director for House Homeland Security Chairman Michael 
McCaul, said that McCaul will likely “re-introduce legislation to create a 
commission charged with examining tradeoffs between privacy and 
security in digital technology” in 2017.78 Carson said that is far better than 
having events such as cases “where someone’s child’s been abducted . . . 
[or one] with national security implications” drive policy.79 He is probably 
right when he predicted that if such events occur “it’s going to be a 
horribly irrational conversation.”80 
Commissions and studies are all well and good, but there is little to 
suggest that there is a better way of finding that balance in much the same 
way it’s always been—that is, for the courts to determine what is or is not 
permitted by the Constitution and the applicable statutes. There is nothing 
to dispute the idea that most people are satisfied with having the courts 
make these tough calls.  
Of course, as a society, we can decide that we want more privacy than 
the Constitution or existing law might provide, but we ought not kid 
ourselves that there is no cost to doing so. It is certain that every terrorist, 
drug dealer, Wall Street cheat, sex-slaver, and crook of every variety will 
use a secure device if they think it will shield them from law enforcement, 
and to the extent that using such devices fulfills that desire, we have to 
expect and accept more terrorism and more crime. Significantly, that cost 
and risk will not be borne by those who are profiting from the devices, but 
by those without the resources or ability to protect themselves.  
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